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NOTE
Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited
Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act

Benjamin Means
"Nobody is trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters from
killing game out of season . . . ."1

INTRODUCTION
Dissatisfied with the protection afforded wildlife by more recent
environmental laws, some environmentalists seek to reinterpret one
of the oldest federal environmental laws, the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (MBTA).2 Long understood simply to regulate hunting,3 the
MBTA makes it illegal to "take" or "kill" migratory birds without a
permit.4 The MBTA imposes strict liability for a violation.5
1. 55 CoNG. R:Ec. 4816 (1917) (statement of Sen. Smith).
2. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.§§ 703-712 (1994) (original version at ch.128, 40
Stat.755 (1918)). For legal scholarship advocating a broad interpretation of the MBTA, see
George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T.Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Mi
gratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U.CoLO. L. R:Ev. 165 (1979); Erin C.Perkins, Co=ent, Migra

tory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Rejuvenate
America's National Environmental Policy, 92 Nw. U.L. R:Ev. 817 (1998); Craig D. Sjostrom,
Comment, OfBirds and Men: The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 26 IDAHo L. R:Ev. 371 (1989).
3. See Mahler v.United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559 ( S.D.Ind.1996). In con
cluding that habitat modification does not fall within the ambit of the MBTA, the court noted
the complete absence of any such prosecutions in the MBTA's 80-year history. See 927 F.
Supp.at 1581. See also Seattle Audubon Socy.v.Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302-03 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the MBTA concerns "physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers").
4. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 ("Unless and except as permitted by regulations . .. it shall be
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill,
attempt to take, capture, or kill ...any migratory bird ...."). The accompanying regulations
define a "migratory bird" as "any bird, whatever its origin ... which belongs to a species
listed in §10.13...." 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1997). As discussed infra at note 10, nearly every
species of bird in North America is now included.
5. See 16 U.S.C.§ 707(a) ("[A]ny person ...who shall violate any provisions ...shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and ...shall be fined not more than $500 or be imprisoned
not more than six months, or both."). See also United States v. FM C Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 906
(2d Cir.1978) ("[ C]ases involving hunters have consistently held that'...it is not necessary
that the government prove that a defendant violated [the MBTA's] provisions with guilty
knowledge or specific intent to commit the violation."' (quoting Rogers v.United States, 367
F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966))); United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky.
1939) (finding irrelevant whether defendants knew they were violating the statute).
Misdemeanor convictions still do not require knowledge, but in 1986 Congress amended
the MBTA to require that felony violations be committed "knowingly." See 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(b). A "knowing" violation, however, may not require specific intent to violate the
statute. The Senate report states that a defendant must be shown merely to know that his
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A heady combination of strict liability, criminal penalty provi
sions, and vague language, the MBTA appeals to those seeking to
control land use activity.6 Some environmentalists advocate an in
terpretation of the MBTA that, contrary to legislative intent and 80
years of enforcement practice, would make any activity resulting in
the death of migratory birds a violation of the MBTA, regardless of
whether the defendants directed their activity at wildlife.7 This
Note argues, however, that the MBTA covers only activity that is
directed at wildlife, and that absent such purposive conduct, no vio
lation exists. s
Extending the MBTA's reach beyond activity directed at wild
life would hamper normal land use activities that often result in
bird death - such as farming, timber harvesting, and brush clearing
- because causing the death of almost any bird would amount to a
violation of the law. Migratory birds include "many of the most
numerous and least endangered species one can imagine."9 Almost
all species of North American birds, including crows, grackles, and
pigeons, are listed by the Interior Department as migratory birds.10

action amounted to a taking and that the item taken was a bird. See S. REP. No. 99-445, at 16
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128; cf. United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187
(6th Cir. 1992) (holding that, for a knowing criminal violation of the Clean Water Act, actual
knowledge of the permit requirement need not be shown). See generally Susan F.
Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental
Example, ENVI'L.L.1165, 1242 (1995) (concluding that it is still uncertain whether the knowl
edge requirement will substantially alter the government's burden in proving felony viola
tions of the MBTA).
6. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 371 ("The META is a concise statute, written in
general language flexible enough to be used in situations beyond its original scope. This,
ironically, places the MBTA at a certain advantage compared to other, more specific environ
mental statutes." (emphasis added)). For the argument that imprecision in drafting should
not defeat clearly discernible legislative intent, see generally infra Part I.
7. See, e.g., Appellants' Reply Brief at 1-4, Newton County Wildlife Assn. v. United
States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1035 (1998) (No. 963463) [hereinafter Appellants' Reply Brief] (arguing that timber harvesting during nesting
season violates the MBTA because it causes bird deaths).
8. This Note does not dispute that the MBTA imposes strict liability. Under strict liabil
ity, the government can always prosecute conduct that amounts to a violation - hunting
without a permit, for example - and need not show that the defendants had any idea that
they were violating the statute. Rather, this Note points out that the inclusion of strict liabil
ity language in the statute does not answer the question of what amounts to the actus reus of
a violation.
9. Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1576 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
10. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 190 ("The MBTA now protects nearly all native
birds in the country, of which there are millions if not billions, so there is no end to the
possibilities for an arguable violation."). For a complete listing of protected migratory birds,
see 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1997). "[I]f
the META prohibits the inadvertently-caused death of
any migratory bird . . . land uses on tens of millions of acres would be impaired." T11Dber
Appellees' Brief at 2, Newton County Wildlife Assn. , 113 F.3d 110 (No. 96-3463) [hereinafter
T11Dber Appellees' Brief].
• . .
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No de minimjs exception appears to apply, because the l\1BT A
makes unlawful the taking of a single migratory bird.11
Courts disagree about the breadth of the l\1BT A. Some have
read the l\1BT A broadly and held that it can reach accidental bird
death.12 The Second Circuit, for example, held that a defendant's
inadvertent contamination of ground water (which poisoned migra
tory birds) violated the l\1BT A.13 Recently, other courts have read
the l\1BT A more narrowly, confining it to the regulation of hunt
ing.14 The Eighth Circuit, for instance, held that bird death result
ing from timber harvesting did not violate the l\1BT A because "it
would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to
construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as
timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of migratory
birds."15
This Note argues that the MBTA applies only to activities di
rected at wildlife. Part I contends that the language and legislative
history of the statute show that Congress intended a narrow reading
of the MBTA. Part II demonstrates that, if construed broadly, the
MBTA would become a criminal law of disturbing breadth, and
that the limiting p r inciples that have been suggested
11. See United States v . Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F . Supp. 510, 529 (E.D. Cal. 1978), atfd.,
578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Looking first at the language of the MBTA itself, it is clear that
Congress intended to make the unlawful killing of even one bird an offense. "); cf. United
States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 903 (2d Cir. 1978) (assuming the government's ability to
bring separate indictments for individual bird deaths, including 24 counts each involving the
death of a single bird). The Corbin court determined that where a single act results in multi
ple bird deaths, the principle of lenity requires that only one violation be charged because it
is unclear whether Congress intended to make each death a separate-violation. See Corbin
Fann Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 531. Assuming the validity of the court's analysis, however, it is
still unclear whether separate violations may be charged when the same activity (e.g., timber
harvesting) is carried out over a number of days. The prospect of a jail sentence makes the
MBTA non-trivial, regardless of the number of violations charged.
12. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905-08; Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D.
Ga. 1996), revd. on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1997); Corbin Fann Serv.,
444 F. Supp. at 529, 531-36. The government has also been able to use the threat of criminal
prosecution to gain settlements. See Stephen Raucher, Co=ent, Raising the Stakes for En
vironmental Polluters: The Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 17073 (noting that Exxon pleaded guilty to charges of violating the MBTA and that the strict
liability provisions of the MBTA make it "a potent tool ").
13.

See FMC Corp.,

572 F.2d at 907-08.

14. See Newton County Wildlife Assn. , 113 F.3d at 115; Curry v. United States Forest
Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 549 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1573-74.
15. Newton County Wildlife Assn. , 113 F.3d at 115. Some courts have found that the
MBTA provides no private right of action, see Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551 {11th Cir.
1997), or that the government has i=unity from prosecution, see Sierra Club, 110 F.3d at
1556 ("[T]he MBTA does not apply to the federal government. "); Newton County Wildlife
Assn., 113 F.3d at 116 (finding as alternative reasoning that the permitting requirement of the
MBTA does not apply to bird-killing activities of federal agencies). This Note argues for a
narrow interpretation of the MBTA, but does not address whether the federal government
must follow the MBTA, nor does this Note argue for or against a private right of
enforcement.
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prosecutorial discretion, extra-hazardous materials, and permit
schemes - all suffer from fatal flaws. Part III argues that sound
environmental policy for migratory birds can be achieved without
an expanded reading of the MBTA.
I.

L ANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT

This Part contends that well-accepted principles of statutory in
terpretation16 require a narrow construction of the MBTA. Section
I. A argues that the language of the statute and of its accompanying
regulations covers only activities directed at wildlife. Section LB
argues that the MBTA's legislative history further demonstrates
that Congress did not intend the MBTA to reach accidental bird
deaths.
A.

The Language and Regulations

Statutory interpretation begins with the language of a statute,17
and the plain language of the MBTA indicates that Congress meant
only to regulate activity directed at wildlife. The MBTA specifies
that, "[u]nless and except as permitted by regulations . . . it shall be
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] attempt to take . . . any migratory bird
. .. ."18 Words like "hunt" and "pursue" clearly require conduct
undertaken with the purpose of harming wildlife, and so the debate
16. Traditional tools of statutory interpretation are designed to determine legislative in
tent. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993); NLRB v. United Food & Commer
cial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question of statutory
construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools
of statutory construction.' If we can do so, then that interpretation must be given effect, and
the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it." (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987))). Unambiguous statutory language determines the scope of a
statute absent "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary . . .. " Reves v.Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1989); Johns-Manville Corp. v.
United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that clear evidence of legislative
intent prevails over other principles of statutory construction).
17. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495
(1990); Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989).

U.S. 552,

557-58

18. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994). The full list of prohibited conduct is as follows:
[B]y any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take,
capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase,
purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or
imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause
to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufac
tured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest,
or egg thereof, included in the terms of the conventions . .. .
16 u.s.c. § 703.
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over the MBTA has largely focused on the meaning of the words
"take"and "kill."19
Section I.A.1 concentrates on the words "take"and "kill,"the
statutory language relied upon by the proponents of an expanded
MBTA, and shows that the words actually support a narrow inter
pretation of the MBTA. Section I. A.2 demonstrates that the statu
tory context of "take"and "kill"resolves any lingering ambiguity in
favor of a narrow interpretation. In particular, section I.A.2 con
tends that the surrounding statutory language - "pursue,""hunt,"
"capture,""attempt to take"- evinces congressional intent to pro
hibit only activity directed at wildlife.
1. Take and Kill
The ordinary meaning of the word "take,"when applied to wild
life, denotes intentionally reducing the wildlife to possession. Web
ster's Third New International Dictionary defines "take"as "to get
into one's hands or into one's possession, power, or control by force
or stratagem: ...to get possession of (as fish or game) by killing or
capturing ...."20 This definition makes the intent to possess central. When migratory birds die as a consequence of activity not di
rected at them, as in crop harvesting, no one reduces the birds to
possession, nor does anyone attempt to possess them.
The regulatory definition of "take" accompanying the MBTA
does not contradict the ordinary meaning of the word found in
Webster's. According to the accompanying regulations, which reca
pitulate much of the language of the MBTA itself, "[t]ake means to
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt
to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect."21 The
additional action words in the regulation's definition of "take""shoot," "wound," "trap," and "collect" - help confirm that the
meaning of "take"should be confined to activity directed at wild
life.22 It does not make sense to say that one "traps"or "collects"
wildlife accidentally. "Shoot" also seems strongly associated with
hunting, and "wound,"if not restricted to activity directed at wild
life, would make the MBTA absurdly broad.23
The MBTA's narrow version of "take" becomes clearer when
contrasted with the definition of "take" found in the Endangered
74.

19. See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Assn., 113 F.3d at 115; Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1573-

20. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 2329-30 (1986); cf. , Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 124 (1904)
("[L]anguage used in a statute which has a settled and well-known meaning, sanctioned by
judicial decision, is presumed to be used in that sense . . . . ).
21. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1997).
22. See Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1579.
23. See infra Part II.
"
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Species Act (ESA).24 As defined in the ESA, "'take' means to har
ass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect
"25 The accompanying regulations define "harm" to "include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife."26 If Congress had wanted to include simi
larly broad language in the MBTA, it could have done so. As one
circuit court observed, that Congress did not add broadening words
such as "harass" and "harm" to the MBTA shows that the differ
ence between the two laws is "distinct and purposeful."27
•

•

•

•

"Kill" is less a term of art in wildlife law than "take," and its
scope depends upon statutory context. The dictionary definition
does not advance the analysis. "Kill," according to Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, means, "to deprive of life: put to
death: cause the death of."28 Whatever its potential scope, in the
context of the MBTA the better reading of "kill" requires activity
directed at wildlife.

The regulations accompanying the MBTA focus exclusively on
"take" and thereby avoid the potential for ambiguity in "kill." The
regulations relegate "kill" to the chain of words used to define
"take,"29 rely solely on the word "take" to describe the permit pro
cess,30 and never even bother to define "kill." Whatever independ
ent meaning "kill" might retain in the statute - despite its
24. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
16 u.s.c. § 1532(19).
26. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore
gon, 515 U.S. 687, 701 (1995), the Court relied on the definition of "take" provided by the
E SA and its accompanying regulations to conclude that "take" encompassed habitat modifi
cation. The Justices interpreted "take" broadly in the context of the E SA, where it is a
defined term, despite the traditional understanding of "take" which Justice Scalia, dissenting,
felt should outweigh even the use of the words "harass" and "harm" in the statutory
definition:
If "take" were not elsewhere defined in the Act, none could dispute what it means, for
the term is as old as the law itself. To "take," when applied to wild animals, means to
reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control. This is just the sense in
which "take" is used elsewhere in federal legislation and treaty. See, e.g., Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 ed., Supp. V).
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations to cases omitted). Scalia's dis
sent provides helpful explication of the standard meaning of the word "take," notwithstand
ing the majority's conclusion that the use of "harass" and "harm" in the E SA's statutory
definition of "take" showed that Congress did not intend to rely on the traditional under
standing when it enacted the E SA.
27. Seattle Audubon Socy. v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991).
28. WEBSTER'S, supra note 20, at 1242.
29. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (defining "take" as "to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect")
(emphasis added).
30. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 (general permit requirements); cf. United States v. Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 37, 44 (1911) ("The presence of such a provision in one
part [of a statute] and its absence in the other is an argument against reading it as implied
[where omitted].").
25.
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Context of Take and Kill

The statutory context further demonstrates that "take" and
"kill" refer to purposive conduct. Courts may not ignore the con
text of statutory language.31 In the MBTA, the words "take" and
"kill" are in part defined by the words that surround them. Be
cause all of the words of prohibition in the statute except "take"
and "kill" exclusively denote activity directed at migratory birds,32
it would be logical to assume that "take" and "kill" have a similar
meaning - a logic embodied in the principle of noscitur a sociis. 33
If a party invitation said, "bring your own beer, whiskey, or·other
poison," it would be unmistakably clear that "poison" meant an al
coholic beverage of only normal toxicity. Such is the case here.
Even though it is possible to read "take" and "kill" in a more ex
pansive manner, courts may not ignore the language accompanying
those words and defy the statute's obvious purpose.
The MBTA's prohibition of attempts34 also suggests that the law
is aimed at purposive conduct; one cannot unintentionally attempt
to take a bird. It would strain the statutory language and defy com
mon sense to assert that one can be guilty of an attempt for any
activity, that, if completed, would cause the death of migratory
birds. One hunts birds with the hope and expectation of killing
them. Hunters then are at least aware that they may violate the
MBTA if they do not carefully follow hunting regulations.35
The words "take" and "kill" follow the phrase "by any means or
in any manner"36 and must be read in conjunction with it. The very
31. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.134, 142 (1985) (objecting
to the "divorce [of] the phrase being construed from its context"); Sierra Club v. Martin, 110
F.3d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The MBTA . . . should be read as a whole to derive its
plain meaning.").
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994). The inclusion of prohibitions on selling and transporting
migratory birds, for example, suggests that the statute is concerned with intentional takings,
because sales and transport would likely follow an intentional taking. See also Seattle Audu
bon Socy., 952 F.2d at 302 (remarking that the MBTA "describes physical conduct of the sort
engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of
the statute's enactment in 1918"); Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559,
1579 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ("The connection between these words and hunting . . . is apparent.").
33. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (defining noscitur a sociis: "a
word is known by the company it keeps" (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303,
307 (1961))); see also BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 979 (Baldwin's Cent ed., 1926) ("In the
construction of laws . . . general words following an enumeration of specific things are usually
restricted to things of the same kind . . . as those specifically enumerated.") (defining the
related term ejusdem generis).
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 ("attempt to take, capture, or kill").
35. Cf. United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky. 1939) (finding it irrele
vant whether or not defendants knew it was an MBTA violation to hunt in a baited field).
36. 16 u.s.c. § 703.
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expansiveness of the phrase, however, cuts against a broad reading
of "take"and "kill." If "take"and "kill" include any activity that
results in bird death, despite lack of purpose, then "by any means or
in any manner"operates to ban ordinary activities to the point of
absurdity. Even if the plain meaning of the statute suggested such
breadth, it would not control.37
Moreover, the broad interpretation would criminalize certain
everyday behavior, and the Supreme Court recognizes a strong pre
sumption against criminalizing ordinary activities. In United States
v. X-Citement Video, 38 for example, the Supreme Court indicated
that it would refuse to make a drugstore owner criminally liable
merely for developing film, even if the film happened to contain
images of children engaged in sex acts.39 The Court reached that
conclusion despite statutory language most naturally read to in
clude drugstore owners and despite the absence of legislative his
tory on point.40 A broad interpretation of the MBTA would make
possible prosecution for farming, timber harvesting, brush clearing,
and window installation. The mere possibility of criminal liability
for such ordinary behavior is untenable. If, on the other hand,
"take"and "kill" require activity directed at migratory birds, then
"by any means or in any manner"refers merely to the myriad ways
people might devise to hunt birds.41
B.

The Legislative History

Even if we were beguiled by possible ambiguity and thought
that the MBTA's plain meaning seemed to require a broad inter
pretation of the statute's scope, we might still wonder whether Con
gress could be supposed to have passed a statute so expansive. We
need not speculate; the legislative history of the MBTA makes per37. See, e.g., Perry v. Co=erce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting United
States v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)). The Court explained:
"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In
such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd
or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the
act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results
but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words."
38. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
39. See 513 U.S. at 69.
40. See 513 U.S. at 69 ("We do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such
results." (citing Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-55 (1989))); see
also Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982) (holding that a statute that prohibited
the making of false statements to a bank did not apply to the deposit of a "bad check"
because "the Government's interpretation . . . would make a surprisingly broad range of
unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law").
41. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1579-80 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
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fectly plain that the MBTA was passed solely to restrict activity di
rected at wildlife.
Enacted as a wartime measure in 1918, the MBTA regulates
hunting for pragmatic reasons. Congress enacted the MBTA as "a
food-conservation measure."42 The Senator who introduced the bill
observed, "[t]his law is aimed at the professional pothunter"43 and
"[n]obody is trying to do anything here except to keep pothunters
from killing game out of season."44 The sponsoring Senator ex
plained further that "[e]nough birds will keep every insect off of
every tree in America, and if you will quit shooting them they will
do it."45 By reducing the insect population, migratory birds would
protect crops and ensure a steady supply of food to sustain the war
effort.46 Others who supported the bill shared the sponsoring Sena
tor's sense of pragmatism. In a letter read into the Congressional
Record, the National Association of Game and Fish Commissioners
urged the passage of the law as a war measure to maximize food
production.4 7 An interpretation of the MBTA that impedes the or
dinary land use activity associated with food production would
thwart congressional intent.
In the wake of court decisions finding earlier laws designed to
regulate bird hunting unconstitutional,48 it seems highly unlikely
42.
43.
44.
45.

55 CONG. REc. 4400 (1917) (statement of Sen.McLean).
55 CONG. REc. 4402 (statement of Sen. Smith).
55 CONG. REc. 4816 (statement of Sen. Smith).
55 CoNG.REc. 4816 (statement of Sen.Smith). See also Senator Stedman's grandilo-

quent phrasing of the same idea:
[L]et the boll weevil go to rest amidst the happy hunting grounds of his fathers in that
great and splendid region of our land where he first saw the light. Let his onward march
of destruction be halted forever, and few there will be, even where the doctrine of State
rights is most highly cherished, who will lament his departure or criticize those who have
hastened his funeral obsequies, as is intended by this act, and may his allies of the same
vicious type likewise share his fate. Let the song bird live to herald to the world its
happy and joyous anthem proclaiming the goodness of God to all his creatures.
56 CoNG. REc. 7362 (1918).

46. See 56 CoNG.REc. 7362 (statement of Sen.Stedman) ("Save the birds which destroy
the insects and an incalculable service will be rendered to our country by increasing its supply
of food so imperatively needed to meet the necessities of the war in which we are now en
gaged and to the successful issue of which we have pledged our fortunes, our lives, and our
honor ...." ).
47. See 55 CoNG.REc. 4816 ("'Whereas the conservation and protection of the migratory
insectivorous birds is so closely related to the conservation of the food, cotton, and timber
crops of the country, and the migratory game birds constitute an important source of the
food supply. . ..[T]he said bill is, and should be, considered an important war measure ...."'
(quoting June 13, 1917, resolution of the National Association of Game and Fish
Commissioners)).
48. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 295-96 ( D.Kan.1915) (holding that each
state has a plenary power over the wildlife within its borders); United States v. Shauver, 214
F. 154, 160 (E.D.Ark. 1914) ("The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution
authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the
shooting of migratory wild game when in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion
that the act is unconstitutional."). The Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes, later upheld the
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that Congress would have attempted a law so expansive as to affect
farming, timber harvesting, and window installation.49 Congress
also debated extensively "whether it would be an invasion of pri
vate property rights to allow federal officials to conduct warrantless
searches of farms and houses for illegally shot birds."so The regula
tion of ordinary land use, if intended, would surely have been de
bated as an invasion of property rights.51 If Congress had intended
to pass such an expansive law, it seems even more implausible that
the timber industry and farming groups would have supported it, as
they did.52
Congress appeared to treat the MBTA as a hunting statute in
1960, when it added "market hunter" penalties to the MBTA53 to
distinguish for-profit hunters from recreational hunters.54 The ad
ded provisions focused on the sale of birds and bird parts.55 Had
Congress intended the law to extend further, the amendments
would have discussed other categories of violators and the penalties
appropriate to those categories.
Congress passed up a similar opportunity to expand the scope of
the MBTA when it amended the MBTA in 1974, one year after
passing the Endangered Species Act, which contains an expansive
definition of "take."56 It would have been a logical time to expand
the MBTA's scope, but Congress did not do so.5 7 Despite consis
tent judicial application of the MBTA to hunting alone, the 1974
amendment contained none of the expansive language of the ESA.
By forbidding the sale of illicitly obtained bird parts, the amend
ment reinforced the idea that the MBTA concerns itself with activconstitutionality of the MBTA. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) ("We see
nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut
off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed.").
49. See Tnnber Appellees' Brief, supra note 10, at 28 n.8 (citing cases cited supra note
48).
50. Id. at 30 (citing 56 CONG. REc. 7356-81, 7440-62, 7472-76 (1918)).
51. See id.
52. See 56 CoNG. REc. 7357-58.
53. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act Amendment of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-732, 74 Stat. 866
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 707 (1994)).
54. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1580 (S.D.Ind. 1996).
55. See 74 Stat. at 866.
56. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994); see also supra text accom
panying notes 24-27.
57. See Migratory Bird Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190 (codi
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 703). Cf. Merrill Lynch v. JJ. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 391 n.92
(1982) (concluding that Congress presumably agrees with the longstanding judicial interpre
tation of a term in a statute when it subsequently amends the statute without clarification of
the term) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 55 n.4 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissent
ing)); Perkins, supra note 2, at 851 (arguing, perhaps inconsistently, both that the MBTA
should be construed broadly and that legislative change is necessary to effectuate such an
interpretation).
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ity directed at wildlife.58 The 1974 amendment strongly suggests
that the MBTA is a hunting statute, because no one would worry
about profits derived from the inadvertent killin g of birds.59
The fairest reading of the MBTA limits its application to activity
directed at migratory birds. Tb.at the MBTA prohibits pursuing,
hunting, capturing, and the like strongly suggests that Congress in
tended to restrict only activity directed at migratory birds. By their
own lights, and in the context of the rest of the statutory language,
"take" and "kill" also seem to focus upon purposive conduct. The
legislative history reinforces that understanding.60 Moreover, ex
panding the MBTA to encompass activity not intended to cause
bird deaths would create a criminal law with no satisfactory limit.

!I.

THE IMPRACTICABILITY

OF LIMITS ON THE

VERSION OF THE

EXP ANDED

MBTA

Reading the MBTA to prohibit all activity that causes the death
of migratory birds would make the MBTA an uncontrollably ex
pansive criminal law. Such an interpretation would lead to ridicu
lous consequences: "Certainly construction that would bring every
killing within the statute, such as deaths caused by automobiles, air
planes, plate glass modem office buildings or picture windows in
residential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend reason and
common sense."61 If "take" and "kill" include incidental bird
deaths, all of those examples fall within the literal scope of "by any
means or in any manner." In some situations, "the MBTA would
impose criminal liability on a person for the death of a bird under
circumstances where no criminal liability would be imposed for
even the death of another person. "62
Tb.at result seems so counter-intuitive that one cannot help but
think there must be some way to read the law broadly without en58.

See

88 Stat. at 190.

59. See Mahler, 921 F. Supp. at 1580 ("This language prohibiting use of secondary prod
ucts derived from migratory birds again reflects an intent to prohibit activity that is intended
to kill or capture birds. There is again no indication that Congress intended to reach activi
ties not even intended to kill or capture birds. ").
60. See, e.g., 56 CoNG. REc. 7374-77 (1918) (debating vociferously which states' hunters
would benefit from the MBTA). See also 56 CoNG. REc. 7360 (statement of Sen. Anthony)
("[T]o my knowledge, for the most part, the people who are against this bill are the market
shooters, who want to go out and kill a lot of birds in the spring, when they ought not to kill
them . . . . "). For the argument that modem guns require more stringent hunting controls,
see 56 CoNG. REc. at 7370 (statement of Sen. Raker) ("The improvement of guns ha[s] been
such that [game birds] can be reached in all places, and they are slaughtered promiscuously,
many of them for the market and shipped away, but many are destroyed just simply for the
fun of shooting. ").
61. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978).
62. Mahler, 921 F. Supp. at 1578. For example, an otherwise law-abiding motorist would
violate the broad version of the MBTA if a bird flew into the car's windshield, yet the motor
ist would not violate any law if a pedestrian stepped in the way of the car at the last second.
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compassing such oddities. The proponents of a broad reading of
the MBTA offer the following limitations to avoid overbreadth: lia
bility restricted by prosecutorial discretion;63 liability limited to the
use of extra-hazardous materials;64 and liability only for violations
of permitting requirements.6s
Section II.A argues that prosecutorial discretion is not a satis
factory solution to a vastly overbroad criminal law because it ren
ders enforcement unpredictable, and because it does not substitute
for rational interpretation. Section II.B dismisses the extra-hazard
ous materials rationale relied on by two courts as a standard wholly
absent from the MBTA, its accompanying regulations, and the leg
islative history. Section II.C contends that it would be administra
tively impossible to create a national permitting program sufficient
to cover every conceivable means by which birds might die as a
result of human activity.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
Courts that have expanded the reach of the MBTA,66 and schol
ars who advocate such expansion,6 7suggest prosecutorial discretion
63. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905; Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga.
1996), revd. on other grounds, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.Corbin
Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536-37 (E.D. Cal. 1978), affd., 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
64.

See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907; Corbin Farm Serv.,

444

F. Supp. at 553.

65. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 16-17. One might also argue that the
principle of proximate cause provides the needed limit to a broad interpretation of the
MBTA. For a good discussion of proximate cause, see generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF T ORTS , § 46 at 273-74 (5th ed. 1984). Although
proponents of an expanded MBTA have not advanced this argument, the Supreme Court
suggested proximate cause as a limiting principle in the context of the ESA. See Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U. S. 687, 696 n.9, 700 n.13 (1995).
At first blush proximate cause may seem plausible as a limiting principle, but, in fact, it would
not prevent the criminalization of all or nearly all of the ordinary land use activity that a
sensible interpretation of the MBTA would exclude. Installing a picture window, for exam
ple, directly and foreseeably causes the death of birds. Unless the window itself operates as
an intervening cause, the harm to the bird follows directly from the mounting of the window.
Anyone installing windows is aware, or should be aware, of the possibility (if not likelihood)
of bird casualties. Similarly, chopping down trees directly and foreseeably causes the death
of birds; proximate cause would be reduced to absurdity if it required that the chainsaw itself
make contact with the bird. If proximate cause is used more loosely, as little more than an ad
hoc judgment made by the trier of fact as to the culpability of the defendant, then it begins to
look more like judicial discretion. Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra, at 274 ("[P]redicting outcomes
in pending cases is hazardous indeed if one looks only to theories."). For an argument that
prosecutorial discretion does not provide a satisfactory limit to the MBTA, see infra section
II.A.
66. See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905-08; Sierra Club, 933 F. Supp. at 1564-65; Corbin Farm
Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 529, 531-36.
67. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2; Scott Fmet, Habitat Protection and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 10 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1996); Sjostrom, supra note 2.
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as a limiting principle.68 While it admittedly seems unlikely that a
prosecutor would try a case involving a sparrow flying into some
one's kitchen window - though a woman was recently prosecuted
under the MBTA for giving First Lady Hillary Clinton a "dream
catcher" made with bird feathers69 - there are serious practical
and theoretical problems with relying on prosecutorial discretion.
Discretion in enforcing the lvIBTA would not be predictable.
Enforcement policies might vary from administration to administra
tion in dramatic ways, making long-range land use planning much
more difficult. 70 People are generally risk averse and will avoid the
possibility of criminal prosecution by curtailing otherwise desirable
behavior. We could run the risk of deterring land use that is impor
tant for food production and timber supply. 71
Perhaps some environmentalists would welcome the unpredict
ability of prosecutorial discretion, because it would avoid the
problems caused by individuals who stay within the technical
boundaries of a law while doing their best to violate its spirit. 72 On
the other hand, the fuzzy boundary of the lvIBTA would be excep
tionally broad. The potential scope of the MBTA has already
caused apprehension. 73
68. See, e.g., FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905 (stating that where conviction "would offend
reason and co=on sense," resolution through nominal penalties "can be left to the sound
discretion of prosecutors and the courts").
69. See
Nightmare,

Alan McConagha, Hillary's Feathered Gift Gets Plucked: 'Dream Catcher' is a
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at A3; They Swooped, THE EcoNOMIST, Aug. 19,
1995, at 27 ("If you are the sort of American who believes the federal government is bird
brained, here is apparent proof. Peg Bargon, a middle-aged wife and mother in rural Monti
cello, Illinois, faces the possibility of a year in jail and a fine of $156,000 because of an eagle
feather.").

70. For an in-depth discussion of the problems associated with prosecutorial discretion,
see KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, POLICE
DISCRETION (1975); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18
AM. J. CoMP. L. 532 (1970).
71. This would be especially ironic because in 1918 Congress thought it was passing a law
that would aid the war effort by spurring just such productive land use. See supra text accom
panying notes 42-47.

72. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HAR.v.
L. REv. 22, 63 (1992) (arguing "that bright-line rules allow the 'bad man' to engage in socially
unproductive behavior right up to the line; on a pessimistic view of human nature, the chilling
effect of standards can be a good thing").
73. See, e.g., Farley, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ARMY LAw., Dec. 1996, at 29.
Prosecutorial discretion would not be a limiting factor at all if environmental groups had
either a private right of action to enforce the MBTA against private parties or an Administra
tive Procedure Act action to enforce the MBTA against federal agencies. Although no ap
pellate court has yet allowed a MBTA claim by a private party to proceed against the
government, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1997), the issue
remains unresolved in most circuits. Moreover, the courts have not considered whether a
private party could sue another private party. As the United States Forest Service bas ex
plained, "This approach could effectively require that the National Forests be managed pre
dominately as migratory bird reserves even though Congress has directed the Forest Service
to manage the National Forests for multiple uses including timber harvest, mining and graz
ing." Brief for Federal Appellees at 30, Newton County Wrldlife Assn. v. United States For-
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As a matter of jurisprudence, discretion is not satisfactory be
cause it avoids the question of statutory interpretation: the ques
tion of what the law is in the first place.74 To the extent that the
proponents of a broad interpretation of the MBTA rely on discre
tion, they demonstrate an inability to articulate a theoretical limit
to potential liability under the MBTA and turn to common sense as
a solution.75 Prosecutorial discretion becomes the means for sal
vaging an over-broad law.
Prosecutorial discretion is also less than ideal because not every
prosecutor can be counted on to show adequate discretion.76 This
problem may be acute in a pro-environment climate where, "[e]ach
year the Department of Justice announces 'record levels' of fines
imposed, persons indicted, and jail time served for infractions of
environmental regulations." 77 A prosecutor with political ambi
tions, not unheard of, "might allow public opinion and potential
media coverage" to influence the exercise of discretion.78
B. Extra-hazardous Materials
The MBTA could also be interpreted to reach beyond conduct
directed at birds only when extra-hazardous materials are involved.
The extra-hazardous materials extension has some appeal in that it
is the only expansive interpretation of the MBTA relied upon by
the courts. In United States v. FMC Corp., the Second Circuit found
criminal liability where a defendant allowed toxins to seep into a
pond causing bird death. According to the court: "[S]trict liability
has been deemed to apply . . . when a person engages in ex
trahazardous activities....The principle here is the same as in the
est Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1035 {1998) {No. 96-3463)
[hereinafter Brief for Federal Appellees].
74. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1582 { S.D. Ind. 1996)
("[T]rust in prosecutorial discretion is not really an answer to the issue of statutory
construction.").
.

75. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 191 (arguing that the MBTA should be con
strued broadly, but nonetheless conceding that "it is questionable as a jurisprudential matter
whether the problem [of finding a limit to the law] should be begged simply by reference to
prosecutorial discretion").
76. See Gregory A. Zafiris, Co=ent, Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Ore
gon Environmental Crimes Act: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 24 ENVTL. L. 1673, 1674
{1994) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion "is susceptible to both abuse and error under
normal circumstances, and environmental law by its nature further increases the likelihood of
misuse"). Prosecutors may abuse their discretion by using a vague law "to force an unfair
plea bargain upon defendants who barely fit the technical requirements of that law." Id. at
1681. Elected prosecutors may also succumb to public pressure in high profile environmental
cases. See id. at 1682 ("Pressure from constituents could coerce locally elected district attor
neys into charging local industries for technical violations that would be better handled
administratively.").
77. Trmothy Lynch, Polluting our Principles: Environmental Prosecutions and the Bill of
Rights, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 161, 161 {1996).
78. Id. at 170.
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tort situation . . . ."79 In United States v. Corbin Farm Services, a
district court held that the defendant could be liable under the
MBTA for the misapplication of pesticides that resulted in bird
death.80
The quasi-tort theory of the extra-hazardous materials limit
seems curiously out of place in the context of the MBTA. Nowhere
does the MBTA or its legislative history mention extra-hazardous
materials.81 Both FMC and Corbin have been distinguished in sub
sequent MBTA litigation on the grounds that they constituted an
exception to the normal operation of the MBTA
a gentle way of
dispensing with a quasi-tort principle that finds no support in the
law.82
-

An extra-hazardous materials limit would, in any event, be un
satisfactory to many supporters of a broad MBTA, because they
seek to use FMC and Corbin as the precedential underpinnings of
an expanded MBTA and not as a relatively narrow exception to it.83
The extra-hazardous materials limit, then, has a double disadvan
tage: it is both inconsistent with any plausible interpretation of the
MBTA as enacted and ineffective as judicial legislation.
C. Permits
Some advocates of a broad interpretation of the MBTA might
argue that the MBTA does not require the unreasonable result of
banning all land use activity, but only makes the reasonable de
mand that such activity first be permitted by the Fish and Wildlife
Service. Permitting is not a reasonable solution for two reasons: 1)
no such permitting scheme is currently available; and 2) even if
available, such a scheme would have to be nationwide and incredi
bly intrusive in order to cover everything from farming to installing
picture windows. It is hard to imagine what benefit such an admin
istratively unworkable permit system would be to migratory birds.
79. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1978).
80. See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal. 1978),
578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).

affd.,

81. See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1583 n.9 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(dismissing the extra-hazardous materials limit as having "no apparent basis in the statute
itself or in the prior history of the MBTA's application since its enactment"). None of this is
to suggest that the indiscriminate use of pesticides is beyond the reach of the law. "The
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act . . . would protect birds if only it were
P.nforced . . . ." Ted Williams , Silent Scourge: Legally-Used Pesticides are Killing Tens of
Millions of America's Birds, AUDUBON, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 28, 35.
82.

See, e.g., Mahler, 927 F.

Supp. at 1576-83, 1583 n.9.

83. None of the recent lawsuits against the timber industry, for example, would have
been viable under a theory of extra-hazardous materials. See Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1583,
n.9 (stating that the extra-hazardous materials limit "would not support application of the
MBTA's prohibitions to logging activities").
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The statute requires that every activity that falls within the am
bit of "take" and "kill" must receive a permit,84 regardless of the
ease or complexity of the permitting process, but no such permit
exists for incidental bird death. The general permit provision in the
regulations essentially restates the language of the MBTA:
No person shall take, possess, import, export, transport, sell,
purchase, barter, or offer for sale, purchase or barter, any migratory
bird . . . except as may be permitted under the terms of a valid permit
issued pursuant to the provisions of this part . . .8s
.

Beyond that vague framework, no mechanism exists for permit
ting general land use activity. Nor do any of the special permit pro
visions cover land use activity that might indirectly cause the death
of migratory birds.86 That the specific permits only include activi
ties directed at wildlife suggests further that no one intended to
make incidental bird death a criminal violation.
Only a general permit could include every means or manner of
bringing about the untimely demise of migratory birds, because
processing millions of individual permit applications would be ad
ministratively infeasible. The current general permit contains a
provision for state game departments that requires "accurate
records of . . . the species and numbers of birds acquired. "87 The
new general permits, whatever they looked like, probably could not
realistically include such a requirement. For example, an airline pi
lot is unlikely to know how many birds fly into the engines, and
highly unlikely to be able to identify them by species. All the cur
rent special permits in the MBTA require such accounting, and, as
one court observed: "The detailed reporting requirements show
that the regulations for exceptions are not compatible with logging
operations or other activities that may unintentionally destroy some
nests and cause the deaths of some birds. "88
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994) ("Unless and except as permitted by regulations . . . it shall
be unlawful . . . to pursue, hunt, take . . . .").
85. Migratory Bird Permits, 50 C.F.R. § 21.11 {1997).
86. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 21.21 {import and export permits); 50 C.F.R. § 21.22 {banding or
marking permits); 50 C.F.R. § 21.23 (scientific collecting permits); 50 C.F.R. § 21.24 (taxider
mist permits). No permits for activity such as timber harvesting, farming, or flying planes are
available under the MBTA's regulatory scheme. 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 allows for additional spe
cial purpose permits but imposes substantial requirements, including maintenance of detailed
records of all birds acquired under the permits, that make it unsuitable as a means of issuing
general permits to cover bird death. On private land, prohibiting productive land use with
out compensation might even violate the "Takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. No WAK, TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.12 n.39 {2d ed. 1992).
87. 50 C.F.R. § 21.12.
88. Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1582 n.6. Creating a new permit program would also require
following the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-co=ent rulemaking procedures,
see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994), and could take two or three years. In the meantime everything that
falls within the scope of a broadened MBTA would be transitionally illegal. Perhaps some
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A scheme that could include and somehow regulate everything
from yardwork to flying an airplane during the fall migration is
unimaginable. Yet, if the MBTA included incidental migratory bird
deaths, such a permit scheme would somehow have to be created.
Fortunately, such a reading of the MBTA is counter to its plain text
and legislative history.
* * *

Once interpreted broadly, the MBTA does not admit of limits.
Prosecutorial discretion is both theoretically unsatisfying and prac
tically unreliable - as the woman prosecuted for giving Hillary
Clinton a "dream catcher" made from bird feathers would readily
testify. Nothing in the text of the statute suggests extra-hazardous
materials as a limit. Finally, the MBTA's permit requirement would
be overwhelmed if asked to cover every conceivable type of land
use activity and every citizen engaged in such activity. Instead of
looking to an expanded MBTA, environmentalists should rely on
existing environmental land use regulations.
III.

MORE RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS

In the 80 years since the MBTA, Congress has passed a multi
tude of environmental laws.89 This Part asserts that the MBTA
does not stand alone and argues that the current environmental
framework is more than adequate to protect migratory birds. The
newer laws reflect a more contemporary understanding of ecosys
tems - for example, the importance of habitat90 - and work to
gether to balance the use and preservation of the environment. The
MBTA, narrowly interpreted, provides an important part of the en
vironmental framework by requiring permits for activity intended
to cause the death of migratory birds. This Part contends that a
broadly interpreted MBTA, however, would conflict with the land
use planning contemplated by other environmental laws.
The Migratory Bird Conservation Act (MBCA), passed a dec
ade after the MBTA, is the MBTA's closest relation and shares the
"Protection of Migratory Game and Insectivorous Birds" chapter of
the United States Code.91 As one court explained: "Together, the
Treaty Act - in regulating hunting and possession - and the Con
servation Act - by establishing sanctuaries and preserving natural
exception could be crafted to avoid the temporary illegality, but it is unclear what a final
permit program would look like.
89. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715 (1994); Endangered Spe
cies Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); North American Wetlands Conservation Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 4401-4414 (seeking to "protect, enhance, restore and manage . . . wetland ecosys
tems and other habitats for migratory birds").
90.

See, e.g.,

16 U.S.C.

91. 16 u.s.c.

§ 715

§ 1532(5)

(1994).

(defining "critical habitat").
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waterfowl habitat - help implement our national commitment to
the protection of migratory birds."92 The MBCA authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to purchase land and water,93 provided
"that such [habitat] is necessary for the conservation of migratory
birds."94 Such purchases arguably would never become necessary if
landowners had to maintain their lands so as never to cause the
death of migratory birds. Thus, a broad interpretation of the
MBTA would in effect import much of the habitat preservation of
the MBCA into the MBTA, rendering unnecessary the compensa
tion allowances.9s
On National Forest System lands, comprising over 191 million
acres,96 the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 196097 (MUSYA),
the National Forest Management Act of 197698 (NFMA), and im
plementing regulations provide protection for migratory birds. In
MUSYA, Congress declared the policy "that the national forests
are established . . . for outdoor recreation, range, timber, water
shed, and wildlife and fish purposes. "99 The NFMA gives substance
to that policy by requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to assure
that development plans accommodate multiple usesioo and "pro
vide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet
overall multiple-use objectives . . . . " 101 The MBTA does not pro
vide for a balancing of competing uses and, broadly construed,
would impede the purpose of the MUSYA and NFMA. Under a
broadened MBTA, the Forest Service could not, for example, de
cide that the loss of some grackles was outweighed by the benefit of
a certain amount of timber harvesting.102
92. United States v. North Dakota, 650 F.2d 911, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1981),
Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983).
93.

See 16 U.S.C. § 715a;

affd.,

North

16 U.S.C. § 715d.

94. 16 U.S.C. § 715c.
95. But cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
702-03 (1995) (rejecting a similar argument in the context of the BSA).
96. See USDA Forest Service, Land Areas of the National Forest System (visited Nov. 11,
1998) <http://www.fs.fed.us/database/lar/lartabl.htm>.

u.s.c. §§ 528-531.
u.s.c. § 1600 (1994).
16 u.s.c. § 528.

97. 16

98. 16
99.

100.

See

16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(l).

101. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). See also 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1998) ("[W]ildlife habitat
shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native
vertebrate species in the planning area."); James A Siemans, Comment, A "Hard Look" at
Biodiversity and the National Forest Management Act, 6 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 177 (1992)
(identifying problems in the implementation of the NFMA, but concluding that "[w]ere
NFMA implemented faithfully, the national and global decline in biodiversity would be sig
nificantly redressed").
102. Although the Endangered Species Act also prohibits balancing, it limits such strict
protection to wildlife in imminent danger of extinction. The META, if broadly interpreted,
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Ironically, an absolute ban on activity that destroyed any bird
might prevent activity beneficial to birds in the aggregate. As the
government argued in its brief to the Eighth Circuit, the timber har
vesting there at issue would "enhance diversity of migratory birds
by providing needed habitat for early successional species, includ
ing migratory birds like the white-eyed vireo and yellow breasted
chat, while, at the same time, providing for the needs of migratory
birds that need more mature forest, such as the ovenbird and scarlet
tanager."103 The Ruffed Grouse also thrives in the brush land
which grows in after a clearcut.104
The Endangered Species Act heightens the level of protection
afforded to creatures in danger of extinction. As discussed,105 its
definition of "take" does include activities that "harm" or "harass"
a listed species.106 Extending such stringent protection to all migra
tory birds would conflict with the idea of balancing multiple uses
endorsed by Congress in the MUSYA and would render the ESA
duplicative (at least with regard to migratory birds). Such a change
in the law should be created by a new statute, not the reinterpreta
tion of an old one.
Many of the migratory birds covered by the MBTA are thriving
and, therefore, do not need stringent protection. One might argue
that we should not wait until a species is endangered before we
protect it,107 but environmental regulation is not all-or-nothing.
The issue is not whether we should provide any protection to migra
tory birds. Rather, the question is whether we should allow the
public interest in migratory birds to supersede our interest in pro
ductive land use.
CONCLUSION

The MBTA's plain meaning and legislative history require a re
strained interpretation. If interpreted broadly, the MBTA would
resist principled limitation; prosecutorial discretion, extra-hazard
ous materials, and permit schemes all fail to provide a meaningful
limit. Moreover, the fate of migratory birds does not depend upon
such a strained interpretation of the MBTA. More recently minted
would give the maximum level of protection to virtually every bird. The granting of permits
might ameliorate the problem to some extent, but, as explained supra section II.C, would
first require the difficult task of expanding the permitting system to include general permits
for activity not directed against wildlife.
103. Brief for Federal Appellees,

supra note 73

at 9.

104. See Ruffed Grouse Habitat (visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.vermontel.com/
-epgorge/habitat.htm>. The ruffed grouse is one of North America's most popular game
birds; it is not, however, protected by the MBTA. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1997).
105.
106.
107.

See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
See Coggins & Patti, supra note 2, at 206; Perkins, supra note 2,

at 820.
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environmental laws protect wildlife and seek to achieve a balance
of various kinds of land use.
When the :MBTA is construed sensibly, as a whole and in light
of legislative history, it can be read only to criminalize activity di
rected against migratory birds.

